The only file added is a Cursor dev-environment config; it touches no content, no citations, no provenance, no CI checks, and adds no npm dependencies, so on its face nothing in §3 is engaged. However, the actual diff does not match its stated description: the PR body says it adds a single-repo Aletheia environment (`npm ci`, one dev terminal, port 3000), while the committed file is named "Aletheia + Erebus", declares `repositoryDependencies: [github.com/ejhong/erebus]`, and installs/serves a second, undisclosed repository alongside Aletheia at port 3001. I cannot evaluate what `erebus` contains, and this project operates under explicit confidentiality constraints (§4: no `arc/` or `notes.txt` material, confidential papers never cited), so co-mounting an unexamined private repo into the same agent workspace is exactly the kind of channel through which confidence-bound material could reach published content. The undisclosed scope expansion also undercuts the PR's validation table, which claims all checks were run on the change as described rather than as committed. Nothing here proves a violation, but the mismatch plus the unknown second repository leaves the confidentiality question undecidable from what I was shown; a maintainer should confirm what `erebus` is and correct the PR description before this lands.

The change adds a Cursor-specific environment configuration file to help run Aletheia (and a related repo) in a dev environment. It does not touch any content, citations, sources, assessments, provenance, or epistemic logic, so the rules about real citations, verification labels, exact provenance, and append-only assessments are not implicated. No existing records are altered or removed, and no claims, evidence, or sources are fabricated or modified. The file does not weaken or bypass the multi-model ratification or CI checks described in §3.15; it only specifies install and dev commands and exposed ports. AGENTS.md is not modified, so the human-reserved power is respected. Overall, this is tooling-only and consistent with the constitution.

The proposed change violates the strict dependency constraints established in §4 and §8. The diff adds an external repository (`github.com/ejhong/erebus`) as a dependency and configures the environment to install and run a second server on port 3001. Rule §4 explicitly mandates 'minimal dependencies' by enumerating exactly what is allowed (Next, TypeScript strict, Tailwind, Zod, yaml, vitest), and §8 dictates to 'Avoid unnecessary dependencies'. Introducing an entire secondary project contradicts the minimal static-site architecture.

The diff only adds `.cursor/environment.json`, a Cloud Agent install/dev-server config. It does not edit AGENTS.md (§3.15), content, citations, provenance, assessments, or CI checks, and it does not add live AI calls, servers, or confidential `arc/`/`notes.txt` material to the published site. Referencing `github.com/ejhong/erebus` as a sibling Cloud Agent repo is tooling scope, not a published judgment or a weakening of §3/§4 gates. The PR body/diff mismatch (Aletheia-only vs Aletheia+Erebus) is sloppy description, not a constitutional breach. Omitted-files is empty, so the full change is visible.

The PR body describes a simple Aletheia-only dev environment (`npm ci`, one dev server on port 3000), but the diff actually declares a second repository dependency — `github.com/ejhong/erebus` — installs that repo's full dependency tree, and runs a second dev server for it. That is a material scope expansion concealed by the PR description: misdescribing a change so it passes as trivial tooling is exactly the kind of reclassification-to-dodge-scrutiny §3.15 forbids, and it violates the honest-reporting workflow. Pulling an unvetted external codebase and whatever npm dependencies it carries into the agent environment breaks §4's minimal-dependencies constraint (Next + TS strict + Tailwind + Zod + yaml only) and §8's 'avoid unnecessary dependencies.' Given the project's explicit geo-project confidentiality constraints, merging an unknown second repository into the same cloud-agent workspace also creates an unassessable confidentiality exposure that the PR neither justifies nor acknowledges.